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A consensus has emerged about the conduct of monetary policy that now serves as
common ground for discussion of the speciﬁc policies called for in particular situations. The
central elements of this consensus are that the instrument of monetary policy ought to be the
short term interest rate, that policy should be focused on the control of inﬂation, and that
inﬂation can be reduced by increasing short term interest rates.
For monetary economists, participating in discussions where these propositions are
taken as given would seem to entail the rejection of the quantity theory of money, the class of
theories that imply that inﬂation rates can be controlled by controlling the rate of growth of
the money supply. Such a rejection is a diﬃcult step to take, because the systematic evidence
that exists linking monetary policy, inﬂation, and interest rates–and there is an enormous
amount of it–consists almost entirely of evidence that increases in average rates of money
growth are associated with equal increases in average inﬂation rates and in interest rates.
Under the quantity theory, rapid money growth is the deﬁning characteristic of monetary
ease, and it is associated with high i n t e r e s tr a t e sa sw e l la sw i t hh i g hi n ﬂation.
Evidence from the postwar period, from the United States and elsewhere, shows that
the quantity theory of money continues to provide a reasonable description of the long run
average relationships among interest rates, inﬂa t i o nr a t e s ,a n dm o n e yg r o w t hr a t e s .I np a r -
ticular, the U.S. inﬂation of the 1970s and 80s can be fully accounted for by the corresponding
increase in M2 (or M1) growth rates, and the return to relatively low inﬂation rates in the
1990s can be explained by the correspondingly low average rate of money supply growth in
that decade. Inﬂation in the 90s was about 3.5 percentage points lower than its average in
the 70s and 80s, and the growth rate of M2 was about 5 percentage points lower. The long
1run behavior of interest rates, in the U.S. and elsewhere, can similarly be understood in terms
of Fisherian inﬂation premia. To lose sight of these connections is to lose sight of the one
reliable means society has for controlling the long run average inﬂation rate.
These observations need not rule out a constructive role for the use of short term
interest rates as a monetary instrument. One possibility is that increasing short rates in the
face of increases in inﬂation is just an indirect way of reducing money growth: Sell bonds and
take money out of the system. Another possibility is that while control of monetary aggregates
is the key to low long run average inﬂation rates, an interest rate policy can improve the short
run behavior of interest rates and prices. The short run connections between money growth
and inﬂation and interest rates are very unreliable, so there is much room for improvement.
These possibilities are surely worth exploring, but doing so requires new theory: The analysis
needed to reconcile interest rate policies with the evidence on which the quantity theory of
money is grounded cannot be found in old textbook diagrams.
2. An Economy with Segmented Markets
Many theoretical models have been introduced in the last few years, designed to ratio-
nalize the use of interest rate policies to control inﬂation rates. Many of these are centered
on a class of policies known as “Taylor rules,” rules that specify the interest rate set by the
central bank as an increasing function of the inﬂation rate (or perhaps of a forecast of the
inﬂation rate).1 Theories diﬀer considerably in their speciﬁcation of the economy to which
the Taylor rule is assumed to apply.
One class of inﬂation-targeting models combines an IS-curve, relating the nominal
1See Taylor (1993).
2interest rate to expected inﬂation (for Fisherian reasons) and production, with a Phillips-like
curve relating inﬂation to production.2 Given the interest rate, these two equations can be
solved for inﬂation and production.3 These new-Keynesian models have been used to analyze
the design of Taylor rules, to determine the forms that would maximize a welfare function that
depends on the variability of inﬂation and real growth rates. But whatever they can tell us
about high frequency movements in interest rates and inﬂation rates, these models contribute
nothing to our understanding of why the 60s and the 90s were low inﬂation decades, relative
to 70s and the 80s, or why Germany has been a low inﬂation country, relative to Mexico.
For these questions, the really important ones from a welfare viewpoint, one needs to rely on
some explicit version of the quantity theory of money.
To be useful in thinking about the role of interest rates and open market operations
in the control of inﬂation, a model of monetary equilibrium needs to deal with the fact that
most coherent monetary theories do not have anything like a downward sloping demand for
nominal bonds: With a complete set of ﬁnancial markets, it is just not true that when the
government buys bonds, the price of bonds increases. We may believe that such a “liquidity
eﬀect” occurs in reality (though it is hard to see it in the data) and may regard it as a
deﬁciency that so much of monetary theory ignores it, but the fact remains that one cannot
take take a Sidrauski (1967), Brock (1974), or Lucas and Stokey (1987) model oﬀ the shelf
and use it to think about increases in money reducing interest rates. To engage this liquidity
eﬀect it is necessary to adopt a framework in which some agents are excluded from money
2See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) for a helpful review.
3Where is the LM (which is to say, money demand) curve? It no longer exists, some say, and if it did,
we wouldn’t have any use for it: Everything we care about has been determined by the two curves already
discussed.
3markets, at least some of the time. This idea that markets must be segmented, in some
sense, for a liquidity eﬀect to occur, is taken from the original work of Grossman and Weiss
(1983) and Rotemberg (1984). The particular version of the idea that we use here is adapted
from recent papers by Alvarez and Atkeson (1997), Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2000) and
Occhino (2000),
The model we develop is an exchange economy: There is no Phillips curve and no
eﬀect of monetary policy changes on production. Segmented market models that have such
eﬀects include contributions by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2000). Our simpler model permits a discussion of inﬂation, but not of all of inﬂation’s possible
consequences.













over sequences {ct} of a single, non-storable consumption good. All of these agents attend a
goods market every period. A fraction λ of agents also attend a bond market. We call these
agents “traders.” The remaining 1 − λ agents–we call them “non-traders”–never attend
the bond market. We assume that no one ever changes status between being a trader and a
non-trader.
Agents of both types have the same, constant endowment of y units of the consumption
good. The economy’s resouce constraint is thus
y = λc
T





t are the consumptions of the two agent-types. We ensure that money is
held in equilibrium by assuming that no one consumes his own endowment. Each household
4consists of a shopper-seller pair, where the seller sells the household’s endowment for cash
in the goods market, while the shopper uses cash to buy the consumption good from others
on the same market. Prior to the opening of this goods market, money and one-period
government bonds are traded on a another market, attended only by traders.
Purchases are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint, modiﬁed to incorporate shocks
to velocity. Assume, to be speciﬁc, that goods purchases Ptct are constrained to be less than
the sum of cash brought into goods trading by the household, and a variable fraction vt of
current period sales receipts. Think of the shopper as visiting the seller’s store at some time
during the trading day, emptying the cash register, and returning to shop some more.
Thus every non-trader carries his unspent receipts from period t−1 sales, (1−vt)Pt+1y,
into period t trading. He adds to these balances vtPty from period t sales, giving him a total
of (1−vt)Pt+1y +vtPty t os p e n do ng o o d si np e r i o dt. In order to keep the determination of
the price level as simple as possible, we assume that every household spends all of its cash,
every period.4 Then every non-trader spends
Ptc
N
t =( 1− vt−1)Pt−1y + vtPty (2)
in period t.
Traders, who attend both bond and goods markets, have more options. Like the
non-traders, each trader has available the amount on the right of (2) to spend on goods
in period t,b u te a c ht r a d e ralso absorbs his share of the increase in the per capita money
supply that occurs in the open market operation in t. If the per capita increase in money
4After solving for equilibrium prices and quantities under the assumption that cash constraints always
bind, one can go back to individual maximum problems to ﬁnd the set of parameter values under which this
provisional assumption will hold. See Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2000), Appendix A.
5is Mt − Mt−1 = µtMt−1 then each trader leaves the date t bond market with an additional
µtMt−1/λ dollars.5 Consumption spending per trader is thus given by
Ptc
T
t =( 1− vt−1)Pt−1y + vtPty +( Mt − Mt−1)/λ. (3)
Now using the cash ﬂow equations (2) and (3) and the market-clearing condition (1)
we obtain
Pty =( 1− vt−1)Pt−1y + vtPty + Mt − Mt−1
= Mt−1 + vtPty + Mt − Mt−1,





of the equation of exchange must hold in equilibrium, and the fraction vt can be interpreted
(approximately) as the log of velocity.
Introducing shocks to velocity captures the short run instability in the empirical rela-
tionship between money and prices. In addition, it allows us to study the way interest rates
react to news about inﬂation for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of monetary policy. In the formulation
of the segmented markets model that we use here, there are no possibilities for substituting
5If Bt is the value of bonds maturing at date t and if Tt is the value of lump sum tax receipts at t,t h e




)Bt+1 − Tt = Mt − Mt−1.
We assume that all taxes are paid by the traders, so Ricardian equivalence will apply and the timing of taxes
will be immaterial. These taxes play no role in our discussion, except to give us a second way to change
the money supply besides open market operations. With this ﬂexibility, any monetary policy can be made
consistent with the real debt remaining bounded. The arithmetic that follows will be both monetarist and
pleasant in the sense of Sargent and Wallace (1981).
6against cash, so the interest rate does not appear in the money demand function–in (4)–and
velocity is simply given. Given the behavior of the money supply, then, prices are entirely
determined by (4): This is the quantity theory of money in its very simplest form.
The exogeneity of velocity in the model is, of course, easily relaxed without altering the
essentials of the model, but at the cost of complicating the solution method. In the version we
study here, the two cash ﬂow equations (2) and (3) describe the way the ﬁxed endowment is
distributed to the two consumer types. The three equations (1)-(3) thus completely determine
the equilibrium resource allocation and the behavior of the price level. No maximum problem
has been studied and no derivatives have been taken!
But to study the related behavior of interest rates, we need to examine bond market
equilibrium, and there the real interest rate will depend on the current and expected future






1+µtvt + µt(1 − vt)/λ
1+µt
#
y = c(vt,µ t)y,
where the second equality deﬁnes the relative consumption function c(vt,µ t). Then the equi-
















where Et(·) means an expectation conditional on events dated t and earlier.
We use two approximations to simplify equation (5). The ﬁrst involves expanding the
function log(c(vt,µ t)) around the point (v,0) to obtain the ﬁrst-order approximation




7(Note that the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of velocity changes on consumption is zero.) With the CRRA
preferences we have assumed, the marginal utility of traders is then approximated by
U
0(c(vt,µ t)y)=e x p ( −φµt)y,
where




Taking logs of both sides of (5), we have:











We apply a second approximation to the right hand side to obtain
rt =ˆ ρ + φ(Et[µt+1] − µt)+Et[µt+1]+Et[vt+1] − vt, (6)
where ˆ ρ − ρ > 0 is a risk correction factor.6
From equation (6) one can see that the immediate eﬀe c t so fa no p e nm a r k e to p e r a t i o n
bond purchase, µt > 0, is to reduce interest rates by φµt. This is the liquidity eﬀect that
the segmented market models are designed to capture. If we drop the segmentation and
let everyone trade in bonds, then λ =1 , φ =0 , and the liquidity eﬀect vanishes. In this
case, open market operations can only aﬀect interest rates through information eﬀects on the
6In fact,





zt = −φ(µt+1 − µt) − µt+1 − vt+1 + vt.
In the applications of (9) that we consider below, Va r t(zt) will not vary with t under a given monetary policy
rule, though it will vary with changes in the policy rule.
8inﬂation premium. Interest rate increases can only reﬂect expected inﬂation: monetary ease.
With φ > 0, the model combines quantity-theoretic predictions for the long run behavior
of money growth, inﬂation, and interest rates, with a potential role for interest rates as an
instrument of inﬂation control in the short run. We explore this potential in the next section.
3. Inﬂation Control with Segmented Markets
In this section, we work through a series of thought experiments based on the equi-
librium condition (6) that illuminate various aspects of monetary policy. These examples all
draw on the fact, obtained by diﬀerencing the equation of exchange (4), that the inﬂation
rate is the sum of the money growth rate and the rate of change in velocity:
πt = µt + vt − vt−1. (7)
Example 1: (Constant velocity and money growth.) Let vt be constant at v and µt be
constant at µ, Then (6) becomes
r = ρ + µ.
We can view this equation interchangeably as ﬁxing money growth, given the interest rate,
or as ﬁxing the interest rate given money growth and inﬂation. This Fisher equation must
always characterize the long run average money growth, inﬂation, and interest rates.
Example 2: (Constant money growth and iid shocks.) Let the velocity shocks be
iid random variables, with mean v and variance σ2
v.L e t µt be constant at µ. Under these
conditions, (6) implies
rt = b ρ + µ − (vt − v).
9A transient increase in velocity raises the current price level, reducing expected inﬂation.
This induces a transient decrease in interest rates. In this example, rt is iid, with mean b ρ+µ
and variance σ2
v; the inﬂation rate has mean µ and variance 2σ2
v.
Example 3:( E x a c ti n ﬂation targeting.) It is always possible to attain a target inﬂation
rate ¯ π exactly. Just set the money growth rate according to
µt =¯ π − vt + vt−1.
Then interest rates will be given by
rt =ˆ ρ + φ(−Et[vt+1]+2 vt − vt−1)+¯ π.
If the velocity shocks are iid, as in the Example 2, then Va r(µt)=2 σ2
v,a n drt has mean
b ρ +¯ π and variance 5φ
2σ2
v.
Example 4: (An interest rate peg.) Assume iid vt, with mean v and variance σ2
v.L e t
µt satisfy
µt − µ = B(vt − v),
where the constant B is chosen to make rt constant at b ρ + µ. Then (6) implies
b ρ + µ = b ρ − Bφ(vt − v)+µ − (vt − v).
If this equality holds for all realizations of vt, it follows that B = −1/φ. In this case, Va r(µt)=
(σv/φ)2. T h ev a r i a n c eo ft h ei n ﬂation rate is, using (7),
σ
2







10Comparing this case to Example 2, one sees that pegging the interest rate is inﬂation-
stabilizing, relative to constant money growth, if and only if
φ > 1/2.
In Examples 2, 3, and 4, the economy is subjected to unavoidable velocity shocks.
The variability of these shocks must show up somewhere, either in interest rates, money
growth rates, or inﬂation rates. The way it is distributed over these three variables can, in
t h ep r e s e n c eo fal i q u i d i t ye ﬀect, be determined by policy. However this is done, the long
run connections between money growth, inﬂation, and interest rates are entirely quantity-
theoretic.
Our next four examples consider versions of Taylor rules. Suppose, to be speciﬁc, that
interest rates are set according to the formula
rt = b ρ + π + θ(πt − π), (8)
where θ > 0 means that if the current inﬂation rate πt is to exceed the target rate π,w er a i s e
this period’s interest rate above its target level, b ρ+π. To study the dynamics implied by the
rule (8), we eliminate rt and πt between (6), (7), and (8) to obtain the diﬀerence equation






[Et[vt+1] − vt − θ(vt − vt−1)]. (9)
We can solve this diﬀerence equation “forward” to get












[vt+1 − vt − θ(vt − vt−1)],
11provided that the series on the right of (10) converges.7 We now use (10) to study three more
examples.
Example 5: (A Taylor rule with iid velocity). Let vt be iid, with mean v and variance
σ2









and Et[st+j]=0for j ≥ 2. Inserting these values into (10) gives
µt − π = −
φ + θ
2
(θ + φ)2(vt − v)+
θ
θ + φ
(vt−1 − v). (11)
The interest rate consequences of these open market operations can then be calculated
from the Taylor rule, (8):
rt = b ρ + π +
θφ
(θ + φ)2(2θ + φ − 1)(vt − v) −
θφ
θ + φ
(vt−1 − v). (12)
The money supply response to a temporary increase in velocity, described in (11), is to reduce
money growth initially, increase it in the next period, and return to the target growth rate
thereafter. This will smooth the inﬂationary impact of the velocity increase, w h e t h e ro rn o t
there is a positive liquidity eﬀect φ.I fφ > 0 and 2θ + φ > 1, (12) implies that these open
market operations will raise the interest rate initially in response to a velocity increase, then
reduce it below the target, and then return it to b ρ + π.
7If θ > 1, the right side of (10) is the only solution to (9) with bounded expected values. This case is
referred to as an “active” Taylor rule. If θ < 1 (a “passive” Taylor rule) and the series in (10) converges, (10)
gives one solution to (9) but there will be others–which we do not examine here–as well.
12Example 6: (A Taylor rule with serially correlated velocity.) Assume that vt − v has
mean 0 and variance σ2
v, and follows an autoregression with parameter δ ∈ (−1,1) :
Et[vt+k − v]=δ
k(vt − v).
Then for any t, calculating the terms Et[st+k] and substituting into (10) yields






















Of course, this solution presupposes that the series on the right converges. A suﬃcient





Again, the interest rate consequences can be calculated from the Taylor rule, (8):
rt = b ρ + π + θ(1 + A)(vt − v) − θ[
θ
θ + φ
+1 ] ( vt−1 − v),
Notice, too, that with δ =1we get δ
2 − (1+θ)δ +θ =0 , and the constant A is equal
to −θ/(θ + φ). In this case, interest rates follow
rt = b ρ + π +
θφ
θ + φ
(vt − v) − θ[
θ
θ + φ
+1 ] ( vt−1 − v). (13)
As in the case of iid shocks in Example 5, (13) implies that open market bond sales in response
to a velocity increase will increase interest rates only if φ > 0.
Example 7: (A change in the inﬂation target.) Holding the distribution of velocity
shocks ﬁxed, suppose the inﬂation target is moved permanently from ¯ π to ˆ π. This re-targeting
13changes nothing on the right side of (10), so (10) implies simply an immediate, permanent
change in the money growth rate from ¯ π to ˆ π. Of course, this implies an immediate, perma-
nent change in the interest rate of ˆ π − ¯ π. Neither the size φ of the liquidity eﬀect nor the
responsiveness θ of the Taylor rule has any bearing on these changes.
Example 8: (A Taylor rule on the expected inﬂation rate.) Our ﬁnal example considers
a variation on the Taylor rule, proposed by Svensson (1999), in which an expected, future
inﬂation rate is targeted. That is, we replace (8) with
rt =ˆ ρ + π + θ(Et[πt+1] − π). (14)
Provided that φ > 0, we can combine (14) with (6) and (7) to obtain a diﬀerence equation
in µt − π :






(Et[vt+1] − vt). (15)
The derivation is the analogue to the derivation of (9) for the contemporaneous Taylor rule.
For the case of iid shocks, the stationary solution to (15) is




Substituting back into (14), we ﬁnd the corresponding solution for the interest rate:
rt =ˆ ρ + π − θ(vt − v).
Note that in constrast Example 5, a temporary velocity increase leads in this case to a










The Taylor rule on the expected inﬂation rate that minimizes the inﬂation variance has the
coeﬃcient θ =1− φ.
144. Conclusions
Can a policy of increasing short term interest rates to reduce inﬂation be rationalized
with essentially quantity-theoretic models of monetary equilibrium? Based on an analysis
using a model of segmented markets, we give this question a qualiﬁed aﬃrmative answer. In
the model we used to generate all of our speciﬁc examples, production is a given constant,
velocity is an exogenous random shock, and the equation of exchange determines the equilib-
rium price level, given the money supply. In this theory of inﬂation, consistent with much of
the evidence, interest rates play no role whatsoever.
To this simple model we have added segmented markets: Only a fraction of the agents
in the economy participate in the money market in which open market operations take place.
This segmentation produces a liquidity eﬀect: The nominal interest rate becomes a decreasing
function of the rate of money growth. With this added feature, we can describe a monetary
policy action interchangeably as a change in the money supply or as a change in interest
rates. In this context, we considered a series of examples under diﬀerent assumptions on the
behavior of velocity shocks and on the speciﬁcation of a policy rule.
In the ﬁrst two stochastic examples, Examples 2 and 3, a policy at any date is set in
advance of the realization of the velocity shock in that period: One can commit to a given
rate of money growth, leaving interest rates free to vary with the velocity shock (Example
2), or one can commit to an interest rate, leaving money growth to be adjusted later to
maintain this rate (Example 3). Neither policy can reduce the variance of inﬂation to zero.
The larger is the liquidity eﬀect, the higher is the relative eﬀectiveness of the interest rate
rule in stabilizing inﬂation rates about a target rate.
In the remaining examples we consider, policy (however speciﬁed) is permitted to
15respond to contemporaneous velocity shocks. In Example 4, we show that under this as-
sumption an inﬂation target can be hit exactly by a money supply rule that is conditioned
on the shock, and that this is true whatever is the shock process. In our context, inﬂation
targeting cannot be done any better than this.
The remaining examples in the paper consider Taylor rules: policies in which the
interest rate is set so as to deviate from its long run (Fisherian) target in proportion to
the deviation of the inﬂation rate from its target. Such rules use the same information as
the rule in Example 4 that attains the inﬂation target perfectly. From the view point of
inﬂation targeting, then, committing to a Taylor rule amounts to tying the hands of the
monetary authority in a way that can only limit its eﬀectiveness. As our examples illustrate,
the importance of this limitation varies with assumptions on the time series character of the
velocity shocks.
To rationalize the use of any of the interest rate rules we have examined, then, it would
be necessary to use an objective function that assigns weight to some other objective besides
the attainment of an inﬂation target. We have in fact considered variations on the model
presented here in which relative endowments of agents ﬂuctuate, giving rise to gains from
pooling endowment risk. In a model with segmented markets where such pooling cannot take
place, there can be real gains from policies that smooth real interest rates. We leave the
analysis of this question, the issue of what the founders of the Federal Reserve System called
an “elastic currency,” to another paper.
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